Europe in the Time of Ukraine

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History Begins Again

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How is the war changing Europe? Ivan Krastev on a new era for the old world.

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Tom Podmore

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Looking to rally support for his country, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky traveled ov= er the past 10 days to the capitals of Europe, as well as to the G7 and Ara= b League summits in Hiroshima, Japan, and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, respectivel= y. During stops in London, Paris, Berlin, and Rome, Europe’s leaders = expressed their continued backing for Kyiv. After the Russian invasion last= February, they’d quickly unite= d on Ukraine’s side: Germany declared the attack a turning point for its foreign policy; NATO = was re-energized; and to some, Euro= pe as a whole started to realize its potential as a global superpower. But Germany has struggled since to live up to its promises; Italy elected = a far-right government in Septe= mber whose parties have long praised Russian President Vladimir Putin; and = French President Emanuel Macron visited Beijing last month to promote relat= ions with China—which has suppo= rted Moscow staunchly throughout the conflict. Where exactly does Europ= e stand now?

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Ivan Krastev is a= permanent fellow at the Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna, the chairm= an of the Center for Liberal Strategies in Sofia, Bulgaria, and a founding = board member of the European Council on Foreign Relations. To Krastev, the = war has brought about fundamental changes in Europe’s politics, secur= ity doctrines, and self-image. Upending a longstanding conviction that a ma= jor war wasn’t possible on the continent after World War II, the Russ= ian invasion has led to new uncertainties. European national governments ar= e all behind Kyiv, but they’re divided on how much support to give it= . Ultimately, Krastev sees the war as feeding opposing political tendencies= : A widespread agenda of solidarity with Ukraine is strengthening calls for= a pan-European identity, on the one hand; and a widespread admiration for = Ukraine’s resistance is demonstrating the power of a committed indepe= ndent nation-state, on the other. Out of this contradiction, Krastev says, = is emerging a divided Europe, unsure about what its future holds—not = least amid conflicting views about how much it can trust its longtime ally,= the United States.
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Michael Bluhm: Af= ter Zelensky visited Europe’s capitals in mid-May, and their heads of= state all expressed support for Ukraine’s defense, it’s still = unclear whether they’ll meet all his requests for material back. How = strong is European support for Ukraine?

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Ivan Krastev: It&= rsquo;s stronger than it was a year ago. When the war started, people had a= very clear idea of who the victim and aggressor were. But they also had th= e idea that Moscow was going to win. Many discussing peace talks two or thr= ee months after the invasion weren’t friendly to Russia; they simply = believed that Ukraine didn’t have a chance. So European support was t= entative.

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That changed, first, when Ukrainia= n forces managed to liberate some Russian-occupied territories last summer = and fall. For Europeans, this was a miraculous success. They’d been d= ismissive of Russia’s economic power—but never questioned its m= ilitary power.

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A second reason it changed is that= we Europeans surprised ourselves. If you had asked us before the war how E= urope would react, people would have said we were going to end up deeply sp= lit: The war will matter a lot to some countries and not much to others, as= every previous crisis had led to a lot of division like this.

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The third reason was relations wit= h the United States. In polling by the European Council of Foreign Relation= s, Europeans had been saying, in effect, Biden is back, but America isn= ’t. Something felt finished in transatlantic relations. In a way= , the people saying this were right. The role of Europe in U.S. strategy an= d in the American political imagination had changed; everything had become = about China. But suddenly, after the invasion, the United States came back = to Europe.

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Bluhm: You say Eu= ropeans surprised themselves. How’ve they changed?

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Krastev: On the n= ight of the Russian invasion on February 24, 2022, Zelensky spoke by Zoom t= o the EU Council of Ministers—the prime ministers of EU countries. He= said, I’m probably seeing you for the last time. After that= moment, people throughout Europe did things they’d never have imagin= ed they could do.

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The war was a turn from living in = normal politics to living in extraordinary politics. People’s views o= f themselves changed. They grew up reading books about European history, bu= t that wasn’t about them; now, this was about them.

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Unity in Europe shouldn’t be= taken for granted, though. It could be challenged by Ukrainian failure, an= d it could be challenged by Ukrainian success. If the Ukrainian milita= ry’s coming counter-offensive doesn’t produce results, for exam= ple, the pressure to end the conflict is likely to grow. Or if it produces = great results, and Russian military forces seem about to collapse—wit= h everything that would imply about Russian domestic politics—differe= nt European countries could end up having very different ideas about what a= Ukrainian victory should look like.

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Bluhm: Thinking o= f Russia, EU countries went along with the unprecedented package of U.S.-led sanctions against it at the begin= ning of the war. How strong is the European resolve to isolate and punish M= oscow?

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Krastev: European= governments and publics believe the relationship between Europe and Russia= is broken—and will be for a long time.

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But there’s a reluctance to = cut off all exports to Russia on account of the economic costs that’d= mean. A major difference between the United States and Europe is that, eco= nomically, Russia is totally unimportant to the U.S. economy, whereas it&rs= quo;s quite important to European economies. So European leaders can fear t= hat if the economic costs of sanctioning Russia become too high, they&rsquo= ;ll be punished by voters.

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Our policies toward Russia aren&rs= quo;t about what we can do to them; they’re about what we can afford.=

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Fabien Barral

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More from Ivan Krastev at The = Signal:

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“If you go beyond go= vernment policies and look at public opinion, you might be surpris= ed at how divided Eastern Europeans are. The divisions follow the maps of t= he three former continental empires: Ottoman, Habsburg, and Russian. Poland= and the Baltic republics are taking in the most refugees and giving Ukrain= e the most support. These countries of Eastern Europe that were part of the= Russian Empire are the strongest supporters of Ukraine and the strongest c= ritics of Russia. But in Bulgaria, almost 60 percent of the population is a= gainst giving any weapons to Ukraine. Romania is not a pro-Russian country&= mdash;it has a major conflict with Russia over Moldova—but people&rsq= uo;s views there aren’t like people’s in Poland. Countries that= were part of the Ottoman Empire—Bulgarians, Greeks, Romanians, and S= erbs—aren’t particularly supportive of Ukraine; and countries t= hat were part of the Habsburg Empire—Austria, Hungary, Slovakians, an= d Croatians—are in between.”

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“The war is having t= wo contradictory effects on European illiberalism. On the one hand= , it’s pushed some illiberal forces toward more mainstream views. The= best example is Italy’s Prime Minster Giorgia Meloni from the fierce= ly nationalist Fratelli d’Italia (Brothers of Italy), a direct descen= dant of Benito Mussolini’s National Fascist Party. The war reconciled= this kind of party—Euro-skeptical and always trumpeting national sov= ereignty—to the idea of Europe. They now see Europe under threat, so = support for Putin has declined among the European far right. On the other h= and, the Ukrainian resistance is a strong manifestation of the transformati= ve power of civic nationalism—and nationalism is a core principle for= Europe’s authoritarian populists. Ukrainians are dying for a country= that was until recently dysfunctional and corrupt. But now they’re a= ble to self-organize and more or less defeat the second-strongest army in t= he world. So this war is at once a European moment and a nationalist moment= —and both sides of the political spectrum are trying to build their i= dentities on it.”

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“The big problem for= Europe … is its future relations with the United Stat= es. Another thing the war has shown is that, in terms of security, Europe i= s still a protectorate of the United States. Yet Europeans are less sure no= w than they were before the war that they really know what American policy = is going to look like over the next decade. This is what’s driving th= e differences in how European countries are behaving. Macron is going to Ch= ina and saying, Europe is a third power pole, along with the U.S. and Ch= ina. The Poles and others are saying, There is no Europe; there&rsqu= o;s only the West, which will be the player in this new international order= .”

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