Friends Like These

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Boundary Issues

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How’s the war in Ukraine cha= nging things between Beijing and Moscow? Eyck Freymann on = the challenges of navigating “a strategic mess for the Chinese.&rdquo= ;

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Ivy Gould / The Signal

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A state visit to Moscow in= late March signaled Chinese President Xi Jinping’s enduring= commitment to the close relationship he’s developed with his Russian= counterpart, Vladimir Putin. Early last year, three weeks before Russia in= vaded Ukraine, Xi and Putin met in Beijing, announcing that their countries= ’ partnership was now at a level<= /a> with “no limits” and “no forbidden zones.”

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Since the invasion, the alliance h= as appeared unshaken—despite Moscow’s military failures, its isolation by the West, and the damage the war has brought to the Russi= an economy from international sanctions= and the loss of major export m= arkets for natural gas. The remarkable resilience of the partnership is= significant, potentially not least as the foundation of a bloc opposing th= e West in a new Cold War between de= mocracies and autocracies. Still, China continues to refuse Russia any mili= tary assistance against Ukraine, and just last week Beijing’s ambassa= dor to the EU insisted that China wasn’t on Putin’s side in the= war at all—and that the phrase “no limits” was just rhet= orical. So what’s the status of the relationship, exactly?

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Eyck Freymann is = the author of One Belt One Road: Ch= inese Power Meets the World. To Freymann, the close connection bet= ween Xi and Putin, and the close alignment between Beijing and Moscow in th= e years and months leading up to the war, have taken very complicated turns= now. Russia is overextended and isolated, needing all the support it can g= et from its most powerful ally in the world. And China is anxious, needing = for its own sake to ensure Putin remains in power while managing increasing= ly fraught relations around the world—which Russia’s blunder in= Ukraine continues to make only more difficult. Meanwhile, neither Beijing = nor Ukraine’s allies in the capitals of the West want China to get di= rectly involved in the war—but depending on what happens on the battl= efield, none of them may be able to prevent it.

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Sean Nangle: How&= rsquo;s the relationship between China and Russia changed since the invasio= n of Ukraine?

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Eyck Freymann: Th= is now-infamous meeting prior to the invasion, where Xi Jinping and Vladimi= r Putin agreed on their countries’ “no limits” friendship= , was a pivotal moment.

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Before that, relations between Chi= na and Russia had been improving since the mid-1980s—and that had acc= elerated since 2013, mainly thanks to the unusually close personal relation= ship between Xi and Putin. The two have met more than 30 times. They know o= ne another better than any other world leaders of similarly sized countries= do.

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But the proclamation of a “n= o limits” partnership was important, because China and Russia have be= en divided, historically, by some real conflicts of interest—as much = as Beijing and Moscow have tried to downplay these conflicts and project so= lidarity to the West.

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They have serious clashes of inter= est in Central Asia. They have a 2,600-mile border and a history of conflic= t along it. The Chinese leadership has long believed it was the victim of b= ad Russian-brokered treaties that led to them losing lot of land—in M= anchuria, modern-day Mongolia, and Siberia. The two countries almost came t= o blows in the 1960s. And the Chinese have never forgotten any of it.

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So it’s meaningful that Xi w= as willing to get behind the “no limits” language. But it&rsquo= ;s also pretty clear that when did, he wasn’t expecting Putin to go a= head with an invasion of Ukraine. And when that happened, Putin put Xi in a= n extremely awkward position.

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Xi has made it clear that, with th= e way he sees the world redividing into= blocs—what he calls the “great change unseen in a century&= rdquo;—China can’t do without Russia. Among other reasons: If t= here were to be a war with the United States in the Pacific, China would ne= ed land corridors to access energy and rare minerals, in order to keep its = economy functioning. China doesn’t have many other close partners&mda= sh;apart from Pakistan, North Korea, Laos, and Cambodia. So when Putin inva= ded Ukraine, Xi couldn’t just abandon him.

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At the same time, the U.S. has thr= eatened credibly that, if China provided Russia with any lethal aid or form= al support, China would become subject to direct sanctions—and probab= ly indirect sanctions as well. Depending on how U.S. retaliation were desig= ned, it could badly set back China’s tech sector and potentially even= destabilize the Chinese banking system. And Washington could threaten to s= end more weapons to Taiwan.

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So China has tried to play both si= des of the conflict, maintaining an ambiguous position that leans toward Ru= ssia. In the meantime, the relationship between China and Russia has deepen= ed, with Russia becoming more dependent on China as a buyer of Russian ener= gy and a supplier of Chinese microchip technology.

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Still, we shouldn’t overstat= e China’s willingness to follow Russia into the Ukraine sinkhole. Chi= na has other considerations to attend to, including managing its relationsh= ip with Europe. And so far—while it’s provided Russia with all = kinds of assistance short of lethal aid—there’s a threshold Bei= jing has refused to cross.

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Ivy Gould / The Signal

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More from Eyck Freymann at The= Signal:
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=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09“From the Chines= e perspective, the quandary is that Putin can’t be allowed t= o lose in so humiliating a way that there’d then be a significant ris= k of Russia cracking up. China is very concerned about the prospect of fail= ed nuclear states on its border. It has enough experience dealing with erra= tic nuclear-armed characters in neighboring states, North Korea and Pakista= n. It also knows that a Russian breakup would be bad for its interests in C= entral Asia and potentially bad for its own internal security—not to = mention bad for Xi’s domestic position, because he’s put so muc= h political capital into his relationship with Putin.”
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=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09“If there’= s a big Ukrainian breakthrough on one of the two major battle line= s during the counteroffensive likely to start later this month—the Sv= atove line in the North or the Zaporizhzhia line in the South—and the= Russian position starts to crumble, it will be a huge problem for China. W= e know from public sources that China is very concerned about a Russian bat= tlefield collapse endangering Putin’s domestic position—and so,= Beijing’s interests. In that scenario, the Chinese might feel compel= led to enter the conflict openly by providing Russia with lethal aid. So fa= r, they’ve been deterred by U.S. threats of sanctions. But a real pro= spect of Russia falling apart would be just too pressing for Chinese securi= ty interests for the threat of sanctions to outweigh it.”
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=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09“The war ha= s also shown the West’s ability to pull together and im= pose sanctions that have some bite—and to maintain unity and sustain = aid. But the U.S. government’s unwillingness to put boots on the grou= nd, despite its support for Ukraine, suggests that it’s prioritizing = the Indo-Pacific theatre over the European theatre. The Russian invasion ha= s actually helped spur a consensus between Democrats and Republicans on sup= porting Taiwan. U.S. policy on the issue is still formally ambiguous, but i= t would be a lot more politically embarrassing now for the U.S. simply to a= bandon Taiwan than it would have been just a couple of years ago. That&rsqu= o;s a major change.”

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The Signal explores urgent = questions in current events around the world—to support it and for fu= ll access:

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