You Can’t Make Old Friends

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‘The Loneliest Generation’

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Why are American men and women mov= ing in such different directions on public issues? Daniel Cox on how the attitudes and convictions of young adults are changing = U.S. political life.

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Cottonbro

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(Originally published 2022 | 0= 6.10)
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=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09Something unusual appe= ars to be happening among young Americans. “For much of= the past two decades,” the Survey Center on American Life recently n= oted, “young women and men have had similar political profiles. But t= he ideological differences between them grew rapidly over the past few year= s as young women became increasingly liberal.” The Survey Center, a p= roject of the Washington-based American Enterprise Institute (AEI), cited G= allup polling that shows 44 percent of young women aged 18 to 29 considerin= g themselves “liberal” last year, compared to only 25 percent o= f men in the same age range—a major change from 30 percent of young w= omen and 27 percent of young men considering themselves liberal a decade ea= rlier. What’s causing this political divergence?
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Daniel Cox is a s= enior fellow in polling and public opinion at AEI who co-authored the Surve= y Center’s recent report on the “growing gender divide in American life.” Cox sa= ys the dramatic increase in progressive politics among American women of Ge= neration Z, the cohort born between 1997 and 2012, comes out of a series of= trends, including fewer young women being married than in previous generat= ions and more of them being more formally educated and religiously unaffili= ated. Many of these young women were affected by the #MeToo movement, Cox s= ays, while spending formative adult years during the presidency of Donald T= rump, whom a strikingly high ratio of them disliked. As Generation Z become= s more politically engaged in the coming years, Cox sees the potential for = their convictions to alter U.S. political priorities. It’s a question= , though—given the prominence of disillusionment, disconnection, frus= tration, and pessimism in their attitudes about American political life. =09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09

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Graham Vyse: What= patterns stand out to you in the political tendencies of Generation Z in A= merica?
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Daniel Cox: To un= derstand how Gen Z relates to politics differently than older U.S. generati= ons do, you have to understand how people in this new generation have been = raised. Many of their parents have emphasized individual achievement, educa= tion, and enrichment as primary goals for their children. At the same time,= Gen Z has experienced less, compared with previous generations, in the way= of traditional institutions like organized religion in their childhood&mda= sh;whether that’d be regular participation in worship services or Sun= day school, or even saying prayers with their families.
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In part, this shift has been drive= n by changes in parenting priorities; but it’s also driven by the fac= t that Gen Z is more likely to be raised by parents with different religiou= s backgrounds, blended families that include children from previous marriag= es, or single parents, all of which tend to have lower levels of religious = involvement.
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Politically, climate change is imp= ortant to Get Z. Gun policy is important. LGBTQ issues are important. I exp= ect abortion to become tremendously important. Yet there isn’t one pr= eeminent, animating political issue for this generation. What’s happe= ned instead is that political identity has become increasingl= y central to people in defining who they are. It’s become a stand-in = for character or even personality.
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That’s unfortunate in some w= ays. It leads Americans to be more politically segregated and to shut down = political conversations based on the belief that knowing someone’s po= litics means you know what you need to about their whole life story and whe= ther they’re part of your good tribe or not. We’re on track to = become even more politically segregated—more politically polarized&md= ash;and I believe the decline of institutions and the unraveling of our civ= ic life are playing important roles in that process.
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=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09Vyse: How doe= s this new prominence of political identity relate to the broader political= trends you’re seeing?

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Cox: Part of what= ’s going on is that younger Americans’ politics are becoming mo= re closely connected with their other demographic attributes. The political= scientist Lilliana Mason notes that people in the U.S. increasingly live w= ith these “super identities”—their political, religious, = racial, ethnic, and gender identities all combining and moving them in the = same direction. You’re not merely a liberal. You’re an atheist,= Jewish, bisexual liberal—and all those identities interact and reinf= orce one another.
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So political identity is becoming = more important, but it’s also becoming increasingly aligned with othe= r demographic characteristics and even lifestyle choices. If you’re C= hristian today, there is a much higher probability that you are a conservat= ive or a Republican; if you’re an atheist, odds are you’re libe= ral or a Democrat. Consumer behavior has become more politicized as well. L= iberals are much more likely to live near a Whole Foods, while conservative= s are more apt to show up at Cracker Barrel. What this means practically is= that Americans’ political identities have become much more than the = sums of our views on various political issues—and that, increasingly,= it’s difficult to separate politics from other aspects of our lives.=

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Meanwhile, there are fewer and few= er places in American life where we can challenge our own beliefs or compro= mise with people whose beliefs are different from ours. It makes democratic= society difficult. More and more, Republicans and Democrats view each othe= r not just as people with different ideas about the size and scope of gover= nment—but as threatening.

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Dan

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More from Daniel Cox at The Si= gnal:

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=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09“In many ways, young = men are doing less well in life than young women in America. Young= men tend not to have as much social support. They’re less likely to = go to college. They’re more likely to live at home. Many of them beli= eve that neither political party is doing much to help them. On the right, = much more than on the left, you hear the idea that society is disadvantagin= g them. Today’s young men are more liberal than their elders on a lot= of cultural questions, including premarital sex and same-sex marriage, and= they’re more likely to have friends or family members who are lesbia= n, gay, bisexual, or transgender. But when it comes to questions about the = role and size of government in the economy, men, including young men, are l= ess inclined to favor intervention than women are. It’s an issue area= where the attitudinal differences between men and women are growing.&rdquo= ;
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=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09“Young men and young = women in the U.S. both tend to want their government to do more&md= ash;on gun control, on climate change, on reducing economic inequality&mdas= h;but there’s a profound pessimism among them, in ways we didn’= t see in earlier generations, about the government’s ability to do an= ything. That has to do with political polarization and congressional gridlo= ck; the government hasn’t shown that it’s up to handling a lot = of these issues. But the pessimism is stronger among young men than young w= omen. Young men are more likely to think no one’s on their side.&rdqu= o;
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=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09=09“There’s obviou= sly a multitude of negative physical and psychological consequence= s of being lonely, and people who are lonely are probably going to be less = active in politics. In extreme cases, loneliness results in anti-social beh= avior—not just outright violence but a general lack of participation = in civil society, marriage, and community life. My concern would be that lo= neliness in Gen Z will lead to apathy and even political nihilism over time= . Still, it’s remarkable meanwhile that, despite lower engagement in = civic and religious organizations, young people still are participating in = politics at reasonable levels, at least by historical standards.”

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