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Ground Shift

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What do Ukrai= ne’s lightning battlefield gains mean for global politics? Ch= ris Miller on the shifting calculations in Moscow, Beijing, and th= e West.

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Oles Navrotskyi

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In a s= tunning counter-offensive, Ukraine has retaken hundreds of square = miles of its territory from Russian military occupation in the past two wee= ks. Ukrainian armed forces have now regained control of much of the northea= stern part of the country, including the city of Kharkiv, while Russian tro= ops rapidly retreat. Ukraine’s military has also made gains in the co= untry’s south. Media coverage of the victories shows residents of lib= erated cities tearfully welcoming Ukrainian soldiers, while hasty Russian w= ithdrawals have left behind weapons, vehicles, even food and clothing. But = these developments are bringing important consequences outside the country&= rsquo;s borders too. Russia’s dramatic and surprising losses will aff= ect the dynamics around Vladimir Putin in Moscow, as well as how key Kremli= n allies, such as China, see the conflict—and Putin himself. Politica= l and military leaders in the West could adapt their thinking to Ukraine&rs= quo;s military progress, as well, as they monitor the situation and decide = how to back Kyiv. What are the full geopolitics implications of the counter= -offensive?

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=09=09=09=09=09=09Chris Miller is an assistant professor o= f international history at Tufts University’s Fletcher School of Law = and Diplomacy and the co-director of the school’s Russia and Eurasia = Program. To Miller, it’s now clear within Russia that Putin’s s= trategies for the war—touting its successes, downplaying its costs, a= nd using Russian energy supplies to pres= sure the West—are all failing. Putin has put himself in an untenable position, Miller says, by constantly f= raming the war as easy to win, because Putin can’t now admit to the s= ubstantial human and material resources Russia needs to push back against t= he Ukrainian advance. Meanwhile, his most important ally, China, now seems = to have made a very poor decision in sti= cking close to Moscow, with Russia looking increasingly weak as a global po= wer. As Miller sees it, Kyiv’s gains on the ground are changing how W= estern leaders perceive possible resolutions= of the conflict—but while these gains make a Ukrainian victory m= ore likely, the ultimate outcome of the war is still unclear.
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——= —

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=09=09=09=09=09=09Michael Bluhm: What do you make of these= recent and ongoing battlefield gains?

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=09=09=09=09=09=09Chris Miller: It’s always difficul= t to make predictions in a war, but everyone has regularly underestimated U= kraine’s capabilities since the start of this one.

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Clearly, the U= krainians have demonstrated the ability to launch a meaningful counter-offe= nsive against the Russians. Clearly, the Russians have demonstrated an inab= ility to properly defend against it—unable to have intelligence about= where Ukraine is going to attack and unable to maintain the reserve capaci= ty to reinforce positions facing pressure from the Ukrainians.
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We don’t= know to what extent that’s generalizable across all Russian position= s or whether it’s somehow unique to the Kharkiv area. Insofar as it&r= squo;s generalizable, Russia’s defeats during the past couple of week= s will weaken its ability to stand up to Ukrainian pressure that much more.=
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I don’t = think that means Ukraine is about to push the Russians out of the country i= n the coming weeks. But it does mean that Ukraine has a plausible story it = can tell about how, if it keeps getting arms and the support it needs from = the West, it can defeat the Russians over the coming months.

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=09=09=09=09=09=09Bluhm: How do you see these shifts on th= e ground in Ukraine affecting Putin&rsquo= ;s position in Russia?

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Miller= : It’s clearly embarrassing for him. Putin has identified th= is war with himself since day one. He promised Russians that it would be a = straightforward operation—and within Russia, it’s generally sti= ll described as a “special military operation,” to emphasize th= at it’s not going to impose vast costs on the Russian people.

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=09=09=09=09=09=09But it’s become clear over the past six months that= Russia can’t achieve its goals in Ukraine without a drastic mobiliza= tion of the Russian populace and economy. And even that might not achieve M= oscow’s goals. But the set of half-measures in play now is less likel= y to work still.

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=09=09=09=09=09=09Although Russia started the war with much larger armed fo= rces than Ukraine, Russia is facing issues with a lack of personnel—w= hich shows the dilemma Putin’s set up. He’s afraid to organize = a general mobilization because he’s promised a cost-free or at least = low-cost war—and yet he’s got serious manpower issues because h= e can’t call up large number of Russians and force them to serve in t= he army.

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=09=09=09=09=09=09He’s facing pressure both from the anti-war doves a= nd the pro-war hawks. The doves can’t articulate this view in public,= but people are obviously asking in private, What’s the point of = this whole war, anyway? The hawks are saying, Let’s mobilize= . Let’s call up tens of thousands more troops, let’s throw the = economy into a wartime footing, and let’s win.

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=09=09=09=09=09=09Putin stands uncomfortably in the middle, asserting maxim= alist goals of defeating Ukraine while being unwilling to devote the resour= ces needed to have a real shot at it.

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Oles Navrotskyi

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More from = Chris Miller at The Signal:

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=09=09=09=09=09=09“There’s a chance that the <= em>muddle-through option could work—in other words, that Russia = could maintain the current level of resources Putin’s devoted to the = war without trying to bring new men into the Russian army and that, maybe, = it’ll work. But any sober observer, outside Russia or within, will sa= y it’s unlikely. At the same time, Putin’s also been pursuing a= strategy of pressuring the West economically, hoping that the more Europea= n energy prices increase, and the more Western consumers feel the pain from= expensive oil and gas, the less the West generally will be willing to supp= ort Ukraine. But that hasn’t happened either—so far. It’s= clear that Russia can drive up energy prices, especially in Europe, but it= ’s not clear that this will force concessions from European leaders. = Most likely, Russia will continue pursuing these two strategies, for at lea= st some time, and hope that they produce different results—which I wo= uldn’t say is a particularly rational policy-making process.” =09=09=09=09=09=09

=09=09=09=09=09=09“China has been hedging since the = start of the war—but it was hedging on the assumption that Russia wou= ld win or achieve some sort of result that looks close to victory. Now the = opposite’s happened. Beijing has been hedging between the West, on th= e one hand, and a Moscow, on the other, that looks a lot less competent tha= n it did seven months ago—and particularly, a lot less competent in t= he sphere where Russia has historically punched above its weight: military = capability. If Russia’s military isn’t nearly as impressive as = we thought, then Moscow looks like a much less relevant player, because rea= listically, it has very few other levers of power that it can pull. If it i= s true that Russia is less relevant, then it looks like a strategic error o= n China’s part to have hedged between a less relevant, less powerful,= less impressive Russia and a more influential, more powerful West. I don&r= squo;t think Chinese President Xi Jinping is going to admit that error, but= the better Ukraine does in the war, the less intelligent this Chinese poli= cy of hedging will appear.”

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=09=09=09=09=09=09“Ukraine’s battlefield gains= are unlikely to affect the energy calculus on the European side, because t= he changes underway in Europe aren’t designed to be relevant over a m= atter of weeks or months but over years. Regardless of what happens on the = battlefield in the next three or six months, Europe will be buying substant= ially less Russian gas in a couple of years’ time—maybe zero, m= aybe a small amount, but far less than it’s buying today. The same is= true with oil. European oil imports are going to decline regardless of wha= t happens on the battlefield. Europe has made a generational decision to dr= amatically reduce its reliance on Russian energy. It concluded that its pri= or decision to integrate with Russia through energy supplies was a mistake.= And that conclusion isn’t going to change, whether Ukraine continues= its counter-offensive or Russia manages to fight back.”

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——= —

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The Signal is a digital publicati= on exploring key questions in democratic life and the human world, sustaine= d entirely by readers like you. To support The Signal and for full access:<= /div> =09=09=09=09=09=09

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